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Abstract: Corporate governance issues are critical in university spin-offs because, since their substantially knowledge and technology-driven 
nature, investments are characterized by rapid growth and real investment opportunities, affecting innovative activity too.  In this view, the paper 
investigate the role of the board of directors’ composition on innovation performance of university spin-offs. Based on a panel sample of 478 Italian 
university spin-offs, the results show that board size has an inverted-U-shaped relationship with innovation, remarking that not too large boards 
are more efficient and work better, influencing in a positive way the innovation activity of the spin-off. Regarding the impact of the outside direc-
tors, the results seems to invalidate its positive and significant effect on innovation performance. Also the CEO-duality seems to have no influence 
on the innovative activity. These findings may represent potential indicators of the optimal configuration for board in university spin-offs in order 
to improve innovation.
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Introduction
Over the past years, the attention given by the literature to the growth 
and innovative dynamics of entrepreneurship through university 
spin-offs, i.e. new technology-based fi rms (N TBFs) ge nerally small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs ) created with the support of the 
university and its members, has significantly increased (Niosi, 2006; 
Sternberg, 2014; Guerrero et al., 2016). These university start-ups 
constitute a potential active tool in stimulating the creation of va-
lue, innovation and the development of knowledge-based economies 
(Sternberg, 2014). Therefore, the determinants related to their genesis 
and growth have become key issues in the policy actions about the 
dissemination and the governance of innovation in specific environ-
mental settings.
The literature focus mainly on the macro, meso and micro deter-
mination factors of growth and innovation of university start-ups 
(Djokovic & Souitaris, 2008) but not among those have been deeply 
investigated the dynamics of the governance of the same. However, 
the relevance of corporate governance is recognized by the literature 
(Palumbo, 2010), also those involving companies with similar cha-
racteristics to the university spin-offs, such as new technology-based 
firms and high-tech SMEs (Colombo et al., 2014). The study of cor-
porate governance assumes a particular prominence in the univer-
sity spin-offs because, since their substantially knowledge and tech-
nology-driven nature, investments are often characterized by rapid 
growth and real investment opportunities. These elements may lead 
to generate a potentially high information asymmetry between mana-
gement and owners (Gaver & Gaver, 1995). Simultaneously, they may 
generate agency problems, since the aims and attitudes to risk valua-
tion of the principal does not always match with those of the agent, 
especially in high-tech business (Hayton, 2005). In addition, there 
are considerable evidence that corporate governance affect innova-
tion outcomes of the firms (Belloc, 2012).   In this context, internal 
governance mechanisms, such as those related to the evolution and 
composition of the board of directors of the spin-off were considered 
potentially advocates and influencers to create value and innovation 
(Bjørnåli & Gulbrandsen, 2010). On this view, the  current study aim 
to investigate the role played by the board of directors, in its some di-
fferent characteristics and composition, on innovation performance 
of university spin-offs by analysing a sample of 478 Italian university 
spin-offs extracted from Netval, Aida and Infocamere databases at 
2015.The choice of Italy is not random; indeed, Italy is one of the ma-
jor European countries reporting a rapid expansion of the university 
spin-off phenomenon (Iacobucci & Micozzi, 2014).
The study aims to adds some conceptual and methodological insights 
to the literature. First, we add to the growing body of research on in-
novation by highlighting board of directors’ composition as a poten-
tially important determinant of innovation in university spin-offs. Se-
cond, the results arising from the study could be generalized beyond 
the Italian context, as the European university spin-offs share more of 
the same characteristics and peculiar issues (Visintin & Pittino, 2014).
Theoretical background and hypotheses development
In the last years, the focus on corporate governance dynamics has 
grown significantly in management and innovation literature (Belloc, 
2012). This also true especially with reference to the board compo-
sition and features of its directors. Nevertheless, governance studies 
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have concentrated on large public firms instead in private small and 
medium sized firms (SMEs) and technology- and knowledge-based 
firms, as previously observed, the evidence on university start-ups 
are scarce. For this reasons, this paper focuses on the link between 
firm innovation and board composition, specifically refer to its size, 
the presence of outside directors and the CEO duality in university 
spin-offs. 
Board size and innovation in university spin-offs
It was noted that larger boards are capable to provide the resources 
and know-how to perform additional and better monitoring, mainly 
in multifaceted contextual settings (Linck et al., 2008). Next, a greater 
amount of directors let the company to potentially access a superior 
pool of external resources, comprising financial and technological 
resources that are pivotal for innovation and spin-off in particular. 
Furthermore, according to the stakeholder theory, a greater board is 
able to hold other stakeholders in innovation, for instance strategic 
researchers, whose incentive might result in superior innovation acti-
vities (Adams et al., 2010). 
With regard to the SMEs, evidences highlight that these firms have 
relatively a small number of directors on their board (Gabrielsson, 
2007) and that increased board size may generate a positive impact 
on performance. The researchers in line with this vision claim that a 
greater board will bring together a better penetration of knowledge 
and, hence, lead to better strategic choices that finally affect perfor-
mance. 
Nevertheless, the benefits of add more directors can be compensated 
by the costs related to the inferior communication and decision-ma-
king linked with bigger board (Cheng, 2008). Indeed, greater boards 
are potentially less capable because the problems rising from the 
agency issues among the directors (Jensen, 1993).  In this view, some 
studies highlight an inverse association between performance and 
the size of the board (Eisenberg et al., 1998). Hence, the influence of 
board size on firm performance and innovation is a trade-off between 
benefits and disadvantages (García-Olalla & García-Ramos, 2010). 
Consequently, it could be argue a non-linear association between the 
size of the board and innovation in university spin-offs. Therefore, in 
line with the previous arguments, the following hypothesis was de-
veloped:
H1. There is an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the size 
of the board and innovation performance for university spin-offs.
Outside directors and innovation in university spin-offs
Outside directors play an important role in a firm. In the corporate 
governance studies, agency theory suggests that better monitoring 
mechanisms are required in order to safeguard shareholders from 
administration’s self-interests and outside directors are potential 
protectors of the shareholders’ interests through monitoring activity. 
Hence, a high fraction of outside directors on the board might ge-
nerate a positive effect on performance, also in term of innovation, 
by monitoring facilities (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Following the agency 
theory, some studies argue different theoretical clarifications about 
the determining factor of board composition, remarking the role of 
outside directors (Linck et al., 2008). Generally, different types of in-
dependent directors, such as financiers, venture capitalists, may bring 
different assets to the firm or constitute key stakeholders (Adams et 
al., 2010). An emergent body of study proposes that a resilient and 
vigilant board of directors may have a positive impact on the value 
creation in small and medium-sized businesses and start-ups such as 
university spin-offs, facilitating strategic change and innovation (Ga-
brielsson, 2007).
Taking into account the resource based view theory, small businesses 
such as university spin-offs are generally characterized by a lack of in-
ternal resources. In this context, it becomes critical the advisory role 
of the board (Daily & Dalton, 1993), as they can provide additional 
knowledge that can be used by the management in generating and 
applying their innovative strategies (García & García-Olalla -Ramos, 
2010). In this view, the presence of outside directors on the board of 
small firms will reflect the missing resources needed to the CEO and 
the company, supporting performance and innovation efforts.
Furthermore and according to the resource dependency theory, out-
side directors are considered as a liaison mechanism between the firm 
and its environment, which can support managers in the implemen-
tation of the various objectives of the organization (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). This aspect is critical for start-ups and small companies such 
as university spin-offs, which require external access to financial and 
human resources (Daily & Dalton, 1993). Hence, in view of the above 
arguments, the following hypothesis was developed:
H2. The proportion of outside directors of university spin-offs is 
positively associated with firm’ innovation performance. 
CEO-duality and innovation in university spin-offs
The agency-based theory of corporate governance usually proposes 
that the positions of CEO and Chair of the board should be distinct. 
Indeed, merging the positions (CEO-duality), it is claimed prejudi-
ce the capacity of the board to monitor the company (Fama & Jen-
sen, 1983; Coles et al., 2001), since the single individual may engage 
friendly directors and hinder the flow of communication. In the case 
the CEO and chairman are distinct persons, the boards of directors 
are more incline to be independent, as well as more effective and 
efficient in monitoring managers; consequently, superior firm per-
formance are expected. Nevertheless, stewardship theory claims that 
the separation between CEO and chairman can potentially avoid har-
mony and effectiveness in decision-making (Finkelstein & D’aveni, 
1994). 
With specific regard to the SMEs context, such as the majority of uni-
versity spin-offs, the position of chairman and chief executive officer 
is usually held by a single person. This practice has attracted much 
criticism based on the agency theory (Pugliese & Wenstøp, 2007). 
Also in the case of small firms, the need for a separation of the two 
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roles is linked to the fact of how the board is called to monitor the 
actions of top management and evaluate their performance (Gabriels-
son et al., 2007). Indeed, in SMEs independent leadership may lead to 
a balance of power between the CEO and the chairman of the board, 
improving the firm’s performance (Rashid & Lodh, 2011).
Furthermore, also if CEO-duality may potentially stimulate the in-
terests of the close members of firms, it may limit the benefits from 
hiring the best existing professional managers that can be particularly 
large for innovative activities in university spin-offs. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis was developed:
H3. There is a negative association between the CEO-duality and 
innovation performance for university spin-offs. 
Method
Sample and Data 
With the aim to empirically investigate the hypothesis developed, 
sample and data employed are drawn from the national network of 
Netval at December 2015, which collect updated information about 
the full population of active spin-offs in Italy, while data cover a pe-
riod from 2010 to 2014. From the initial population were excluded 
those companies resulting inactive, in liquidation or ceased from the 
certified company registration of Infocamere extracted from the da-
tabase of the Italian Chambers of Commerce. This results in a final 
sample of 478 Italian university spin-offs, whose qualitative data were 
sourced from the same database of Infocamere, from corporate and 
home university websites and, in relation to the accounting data from 
the Aida BdV database, which contains historical financial, biogra-




The dependent variable applied in this study, the innovation perfor-
mance of university spin-offs, was measured by a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if the university spin-off had innovative activity 
and 0 otherwise, as declared by companies and reported in the ori-
ginal database used for the study (see Section Sample and Data for 
details).
Independent variables  
With the aim to predict the effect of board size on the innovation 
performance of university spin-offs (BOARD SIZE), it was used the 
natural logarithm of total number of members of the board of direc-
tors. The transformation in log is due to problems with non-normal 
distributions.
The impact of outside directors on innovation performance of uni-
versity spin-offs (OUTSIDE DIRECTORS) was calculated as the ratio 
of external directors on the board. The purpose of this variable is to 
measure the board’s monitoring capability, with the aim to examine 
its impact on the firm’ innovation.
Finally, in order to measure the impact of CEO-duality on innova-
tion performance of university spin-offs (DUALITY), it was used a 
dummy variable which takes value 1 if the chairman and the CEO are 
the same person and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables 
It is to note that firm size impacts on innovative efforts of the firm. In-
deed small companies are more able to innovate compared to the bi-
gger ones, consistently to the innovative efforts involved by the firm. 
Hence, we control for firm size (SIZE) by using the natural logarithm 
of total assets. 
Furthermore, we control for firm age (AGE) by using the natural lo-
garithm of the number of years since the firm was incorporated. 
In addition, firm performance has also been remarked to affect in-
novation performance. The accounting performance was computed 
by using two profitability ratio, namely return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE). Each measure was measured by dividing net 
income by total assets and total shareholder equity respectively. 
Analytical approach
In order to test the research hypotheses developed it has been used a 
binary probit GLM in the estimation of parameters, which is particu-
larly suitable in case of dichotomous dependent variables. The use of 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression is inappropriate for this type 
of dependent variables because the possible range of values is limited 
to two sides of the interval [0-1]. Furthermore, this statistical method 
is designed for a maximum-likelihood estimation of the number of 
rates of non-negative counts. 
Results
Univariate analysis
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in the analysis. 
We show minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation values 
for the university spin-offs in the sample. The results indicate that the 
sampled university spin-offs show a medium-low degree of innova-
tion performance, with a mean value of 14.9% of firms with innova-
tion and a moderate dispersion in the sample (S.D. = 35.58%).
Furthermore, the results show that, on average there are 32.12% of 
outside directors on the board with a moderate dispersion in the sam-
ple (S.D. = 37.63). With reference to the leadership structure, in the 
31.7% of the university spin-offs of the sample, both the figures of 
Chairman and CEO are the same person, although this value is qui-
te heterogeneous in the sample (S.D. = 46.55).  According to board 
size, the mean value is 2-3 members per board, with a medium-low 
dispersion in the sample (S.D. = 1.69).  It seems that the boards of 
the university spin-offs in the sample are quite small. In relation to 
the control variables, the firms in mean have 8 years, a value with 
a medium-low homogeneity in the sample (S.D. = 3.78), remarking 
that spin-off is a recent phenomenon in Italy. Regarding firms size, 
the sample have on average 453,907.06 of total assets, although this 
value is high heterogeneous in the sample (S.D. = 1,167,610.94).  Fi-
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nally, regarding the accounting performance of university spin-offs 
sampled, the results reveal a mean of ROE of 3.27 and a mean of ROA 
of 0.17, but the same values are quite dispersed in the sample, remar-
king the heterogeneity in the performance of this kind of firms and 
their difficulties in creating new value. 
Table 2 reports the bivariate Pearson correlations among all variables 
used in the study. Given the lack of sufficient high correlations among 
the independent variables, issues of nonsense correlation are not de-
tected. To test for multicollinearity, the VIF was calculated for each in-
dependent variable. Myers (1990) suggests that a VIF value of 10 and 
above is cause for concern. The results (not shown in this paper) indi-
cate that all the independent variables had VIF values of less than 10.
Table 1.Descriptive statistics.
Variables N Min. Max. Mean S.D.
INNOVATION 2590 0.000 1.000 0.149 0.356
BOARD SIZE 2590 1.000 11.000 2.726 1.692
OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 2590 0.000 100.000 32.128 37.634
DUALITY 2490 0.000 1.000 0.317 0.466
AGE 2590 1.000 29.000 8.021 3.789
SIZE 2139 2865.000 12072852.000 453907.066 1167610.943
ROA 2137 -428.760 88.250 0.177 w30.496
ROE 2016 -147.440 92.360 3.274 31.941
Source: authors
Table 2. Correlations.
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 INNOVATION 1 0.077** -0.039* 0.039 -0.395** -0.112** -0.038 -0.012
2 BOARD SIZE 0.077** 1 0.088** -0.441** -0.073** 0.196** 0.125** 0.091**
3 OUTSIDE DIRECTORS -0.039* 0.088** 1 -0.068** 0.042* 0.238** -0.117** -0.114**
4 DUALITY 0.039 -0.441** -0.068** 1 -0.025 0.056* -0.004 -0.016
5 AGE -0.395** -0.073** 0.042* -0.025 1 0.375** -0.050* -0.048*
6 SIZE -0.112** 0.196** 0.238** 0.056* 0.375** 1 0.065** 0.119**
7 ROA -0.038 0.125** -0.117** -0.004 -0.050* 0.065** 1 0.749**
8 ROE -0.012 0.091** -0.114** -0.016 -0.048* 0.119** 0.749** 1
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; (all two-tailed tests). Source: authors
Multivariate analysis
Table 3 shows the results of the binary probit GLM in the estimation of 
innovation performance of university spin-offs. The regression analy-
ses are performed in a step-wise manner. column I includes all the con-
trol variables; columns II, III, IV and V refer to the three main effects, 
entered one by one, while column VI represents the full model. 
H1 remarks an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the size of 
the board and innovation performance for university spin-offs. Our 
results (column II) show first a positive and statistically significant 
estimated coefficient on BOARD SIZE (coeff. = 0.377, p <0.05) and, 
then, a negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient on 
its square (coeff. = -0.330, p <0.01). However, our findings (column 
III) show a significant negative estimated coefficient on BOARD SIZE 
(coeff. = -0.169, p <0.01). Thus, these results support H1. 
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H2 states that the proportion of outside directors of university spin-
offs is positively associated with firm’ innovation performance. In 
the column IV, the estimated coefficient on OUTSIDE DIRECTOS is 
slightly positive and not statistically significant, so not supporting H2. 
Finally, H3 states a negative association between the CEO-duality and 
innovation performance for university spin-offs. In the column V, the 
Table 3. GLM binary probit regression estimation predicting the effect of board composition on innovation performance of university spin-offs. 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
B S. E. B S. E. B S. E. B S. E. B S. E. B S. E.
Control variables
AGE 1.170*** (0.0911) 1.144*** (0.0914) 1.137*** (0.0910) 1.171*** (0.0917) 1.197*** (0.0926) -0.241*** (0.0202)
SIZE -0.029 (0.0322) -0.008 (0.0333) -0.007 (0.0331) -0.031 (0.0326) -0.034 (0.0326) 0.003 (0.0054)
ROA 0.000 (0.0026) 0.000 (0.0027) 0.000 (0.0027) 0.000 (0.0026) 0.000 (0.0026) 0.000 (0.0005)
ROE 0.002 (0.0017) 0.002 (0.0018) 0.002 (0.0018) 0.002 (0.0017) 0.002 (0.0017) 0.000 (0.0003)
H y p o t h e s i z e d 
effects
BOARD SIZE - - 0.377* (0.1906) -0.0169** (0.0639) - - -0.030 (0.0420)
B O A R D 
SIZE2 - - -0.330** (0.1122)
- - - - 0.047 (0.0255)
O U T S I D E 
DIRECTORS - - - -
- - 0.000 (0.0011) 0.000 (0.0002)
DUALITY - - - - - - - - -0.012 (0.0844) 0.033 (0.0191)
Likelihood-ratio 
chi-square 204.121*** 221.024***
211.894*** 204.172*** 207.722*** 254.203***
DF 4 6 5 5 5 8
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; (all two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  Source: authors
estimated coefficient on DUALITY is negative and not statistically 
significant, thus not supporting H3. 
Hence, the results of our regression evaluating the influence of board 
composition on innovation performance for university spin-offs 
seem to reveal that only board size have a critical function on the 
innovation activity of the firm. 
Results discussion and conclusions
The paper aimed to study the role played by the board of directors, in its 
some different characteristics and composition, on innovation perfor-
mance of university spin-offs. In detail, and based on existing literature 
and theoretical arguments, mainly referring to the agency theory, the 
resource based view theory and the resource dependency theory, it was 
stated that board size has a non-linear effect on innovation performan-
ce of university spin-offs, while the presence of outside directors and 
the CEO-duality have, respectively, positive and negative effect on the 
innovation performance of the university start-ups.  
In order to test the developed hypotheses, a panel sample of 478 Ita-
lian university spin-offs was investigated during an exploration pe-
riod of four years, from 2010 to 2014. The results show that the board 
size seems to have, first, a positive impact on innovation of university 
start-up and, then, a negative effect with the increase of directors in 
their composition. These findings is in line with those of  De An-
drés et al. (2005), remarking that not too large boards of directors 
are more efficient and work better, influencing in a positive way the 
innovation activity of the firm too. On the other hand, the findings 
contrast with other studies (García-Olalla & García-Ramos, 2010), 
which highlighted that increasing the board size improves firm per-
formance. However, the results of the current study remark, accor-
ding to Jensen (1993), that the benefits of adding more directors on 
the board appear to be outweighed by the issues link to inefficient 
communication and harmonization of great boards.
Regarding the impact of the outside directors, the results seems to in-
validate its positive and significant effect on innovation performance 
of the university spin-offs. This evidence appear to deny the postula-
tion that outside directors have a key and superior monitoring, social 
and advising role compare to the internal directors. However, Herma-
lin & Weisbach (1991) propose that both inside and outside directors 
may be unsuccessful in accomplishing their function of representing 
shareholders’ interests correctly, i.e., it cannot be argued that outsi-
ders accomplish their functions better than insiders. Additionally, 
usually outside directors lack key knowledge of the firm compared to 
the insides, as well as they are unfamiliar with the activity and resou-
rces of the firms, including innovative ones. This lack of knowledge 
of outsiders seems to be potentially more evident in the university 
spin-offs.
Also the CEO-duality seems to have no influence on the innovation 
performance of the university spin-offs. The irrelevance of the duality 
effect, although in contrast with the findings reported by Coles et al. 
(2001), it is in line with the empirical evidences of Elsayed (2007) 
with reference to the firm performance. In line of the observations 
obtained from the study, it could be argued that in the university spin-
offs context the separation of the figures of CEO and chairman is does 
not have implication in term of innovative activity of the firm. The 
reasons may be associated to the fact that for university start-ups the 
stewardship theory have major role compared to the agency theory; 
hence, the separation between CEO and chairman may be beneficial 
in term of coordination and effectiveness in decision-making.
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The study has some interesting practical and policy implications.  The 
findings of the current study may represent potential indicators of 
the most proper configuration for board of directors in university 
spin-offs with the purpose to improve their innovation performance. 
First, it is important for university spin-offs have a good and better 
represented (with reference to the stakeholder’s interest) board of di-
rectors, improving their monitoring effectiveness and commitment 
in innovative activities; although it is important that the board not 
becoming too large in order to avoid problems of coordination and 
effectiveness in decision-making process related to the innovation 
strategy. Second, since outside directors seem to no promote inno-
vation, or not have influence on the correlated activities, maybe uni-
versity spin-offs need to select and attract external directors that will 
be more suitable for the firm. Outsider selection is important because 
must give professionalism to the board. Indeed, outside directors are 
useful to the firms if they add further and complementary expertise 
and capability, which should to be able to improve together the inno-
vation efforts of the university stat-ups.
Nevertheless, the study is not free of limitations. First, although the 
paper use panel data, the relative short period of investigation limit 
the robustness of the causal relations among the dimensions investi-
gated. Therefore, future studies may will be benefit from collect addi-
tional time’s series data in a medium-long period, in order to improve 
the effectiveness and clarification of the assumptions associated with 
the causality of the relations studied. Second, although the compa-
rability of Italian university spin-offs data with those of the overall 
European context, additional data on European spin-offs  and com-
parison among countries are needed in order to increase the probabi-
lity of generalizing the emerging empirical evidence and build a more 
robust and specific theoretical background on the matter.
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